Un ATR-42 cargo de Fedex s'est crashe au Texas ce matin a 4h37 heure locale (11h47 Paris). Il n'y a pas de victimes.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/27/fedex.crash/index.html

En voyant la photo, on peut penser que la sortie de piste est du a la neige.

_________________
http://mercure6734.skyrock.com/

La météo actuelle: de Lubbock, Texas , pas d'infos sur contamination piste , mais m^me sur les routes du coin, c'est pas triste semble t-il .


KLBB 271553Z 02009KT 1 1/4SM BR OVC007 M08/M11 A3017 RMK AO2 SFC VIS 2 CIG 005V010 SLP243 T10831106


Je pense qu'il sagit de ce vol là ( Empire Airwys sous contrat Fedex ) provenance Dallas Fort Worth. Les 2 pilotes sont saufs .


http://flightaware.com/live/flight/CFS8284


une photo d'un ATR 72 , la Cie a aussi des 42

C'est bien la compagnie Empire Airways. Voici une vidéo des informations du coin.

[flycomtube]http://www.flyrelax.com/flvplayer/141.flv[/flycomtube]

une vidéo juste après l' accident :

http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/FedEx- ... bbock.html

A chaque, ou presque a chaque sorti de piste d'un avion de la FedEx.
Il prend feu.
Deja 2 MD11, d'on un a Memphis.
Et maintenant un ATR.

_________________
http://mercure6734.skyrock.com/

et au moins un DC 10 ( SWF ou BDL )

Ils transportent massivement du papier ... et du carton d' emballage ...

les pilotes sont partis a l'osto?? blessé durant l'evac, simple controle?
en tous cas au vu du metar la neige est une des causes.. heuresement plus de peur que de mal, au texas voir une telle météo c'est quant meme surprenant

oui , zont pas vraiment l'habitude et doivent manquer de chasse-neiges ....

_________________
Jean-Louis

"Passer pour un idiot aux yeux d'un imbécile est une volupté de fin gourmet" ( G.Courteline)

Dallas : KDFW 271853Z 33016KT 2 1/2SM -FZDZ BR OVC008 00/M02 A3012 RMK AO2 SFC VIS 3 CIG 005V012 SLP201 P0000 T00001017 $

une belle descente de froid sur le Texas ouest !

Attention à la taille des images....

_________________
Jean-Louis

"Passer pour un idiot aux yeux d'un imbécile est une volupté de fin gourmet" ( G.Courteline)

Désolé, mais c'est grand l' Amérique !

Extrait d'un rapport préliminaire du NTSB du 28 Jan :

Appareil : ATR 42 N 902 FX

Météo : 020 / 11 , 2 SM, plafond 500 ft, bruine givrante

Approche : ILS 17

Plan du terrain :

Neige carbonique ou plutôt carbonisée . Sources diverses, pprune et Lubbock Online (journal du coin).

D'après Lubbock justement, l'équipage va bien.

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L'informatique n'est pas une science exacte, on n'est jamais à l'abri d'un succès...

Le NTSB vient de publier quelques éléments :


The crash of a twin turboprop cargo
airplane while on approach to landing at Lubbock, Texas, was
caused by the flight crew's failure to maintain a safe
airspeed, which put the plane into an aerodynamic stall at
an altitude too low from which to recover


" inacapacité de l' équipage de maintenir une vitesse sûre, ce qui a mis l' avion dans une situation de décrochage aérodynamique à basse altitude, empêchant la récupération " .

Facteurs contributifs :

- fatigue

- faible CRM.



The aircraft, which had departed Ft. Worth about 84 minutes
before the accident occurred, encountered icing conditions
while en route to Lubbock. And although the airplane
accumulated some ice during the flight that degraded its
performance, the NTSB determined that the aircraft coul
have landed safely had the airspeed been maintained.



During the approach into Lubbock, at about 1400 feet above
the ground and about 90 seconds from the runway, the captain
indicated a flight control problem saying, "We have no
flaps." Although the crewmembers had been trained to perform
a go-around and refer to a checklist if a flap problem
occurred during an approach, the captain chose to continue

the approach as he attempted to troubleshoot the flap
anomaly while the first officer flew the plane. Neither
flight crewmember adequately monitored the airspeed, which
decayed to the extent that the stick shaker activated, which
warned of an impending aerodynamic stall.



The captain continued the unstabilized approach even though
he received additional stick shaker activations and an aural
"pull up" warning from the terrain awareness and warning
system (TAWS). At that point, the plane was descending at a
rate of over 2,000 ft per minute.



Although procedures for responding to either the stick
shaker or the TAWS warning require the immediate application
of maximum engine power, the captain did not apply maximum
power until 17 seconds after the TAWS warning. Seconds after
maximum power was applied, the airplane entered an
aerodynamic stall and crashed.



"We know that flight crews can find themselves in dynamic
situations, like the one in this accident, where they have
to make rapid decisions often within seconds, said NTS
Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. "These high workload and high
stress situations often manifest at the end of long days
long nights or in bad weather, which is why following
established procedures and using good crew resource
management is critical."



The NTSB also uncovered significant issues related to icing.
Empire Airlines had dispatched the airplane into icing
conditions that were outside the airplane's certification
envelope. Although this practice was not prohibited by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the NTSB has
longstanding concerns about operations in freezing
drizzle/freezing rain and as a result of this investigation
made a safety recommendation to address the issue.



Among the nine safety recommendations that the NTSB made to
the FAA were: improve crew resource management training to
encourage first officers to more assertively voice their
concerns and teach captains to develop a leadership style
that supports first officer assertiveness; prohibit
operators of pneumatic boot-equipped airplanes from
dispatching them into icing conditions that are outside of
those that the airplane was certified for; educate pilots
and dispatch personnel on the dangers of flight in freezing
precipitation; develop a method to quickly communicate
flight information regarding the number of persons aboard
and the presence of hazardous materials to emergency
responders; provide guidance on monitoring and ensuring the
operability of emergency response and mutual aid gates
during winter operations; require all operators of ATR 42
and ATR 72 series airplanes to be equipped with an aircraft
performance monitoring system; improve flight simulator
fidelity to more accurately model aerodynamic degradations
resulting from airframe ice accumulation and ensure that
flight crews are trained on them; and require all ATR 42
aircraft to be equipped with a flap asymmetry annunciator
light.






Encore une fois un problème de givrage et dégradations des performances aérodynamiques ...non reconnus par l' équipage .

Noter la remarque su l' " emphase " ou accent que devrait mettre le copi dans de telles situations .